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Bank	loss	provisioning	rules:	a	convenient	scapegoat
in	the	Covid-19	crisis?
As	a	consequence	of	the	upcoming	economic	crisis	triggered	by	the	Covid-19	situation,	US	and	European	banks
are	expected	to	book	more	than	$50bn	of	charges	on	bad	loans	in	the	first	quarter	of	2020.	The	accounting	rules
that	dictate	the	way	banks	provision	for	loan	losses	are	crucial	because	they	directly	affect	the	ability	of	banks	to
continue	lending	to	the	real	economy.	Importantly,	new	accounting	rules	for	the	provisions	of	credit	losses	were
introduced	in	the	wake	of	the	global	financial	crisis,	and	those	new	rules	are	now	being	blamed	for	aggravating	the
current	situation.	Why	do	provisioning	rules	for	banks	play	such	an	important	role?
Every	time	there	is	a	major	crisis,	accounting	rules	for	banks	are	at	the	heart	of	the	debate.	During	the	2007-08
financial	crisis,	the	accounting	rules	for	the	provision	of	loan	losses	were	criticised	for	increasing	pro-cyclicality	and
thereby	exacerbating	the	crisis.	Those	rules	relied	on	the	concept	of	incurred	loss	and	were	blamed	for	excessively
delaying	the	recognition	by	lenders	of	credit	losses.	As	a	result,	the	US	Financial	Accounting	Standard	Board	and
the	International	Accounting	Standard	Board	recently	introduced	new	provisioning	rules:	the	Current	Expected
Credit	Loss	standard	(CECL)	in	the	US	and	IFRS	9	in	the	rest	of	the	world.	Those	new	standards	use	the	concept
of	expected	credit	loss:	financial	institutions	are	require	to	provision	for	expected	future	credit	losses	using	all
information	available.	The	coronavirus	crisis	challenges	this	new	concept	of	expected	credit	loss.
While	standard-setters	argue	that	the	new	accounting	rules	provide	more	timely	information	to	stakeholders,
financial	institutions	have	heavily	criticised	the	concept	of	expected	credit	loss.	Most	notably,	banks	are	concerned
that	the	forecasts	of	future	credit	losses	are	unreliable	and	inappropriate	loss	recognition	may	lower	bank	capital
ratios.	Given	those	arguments	and	the	emergence	of	the	coronavirus	crisis,	the	US	Congress	decided	to	provide
via	the	CARES	Act	an	option	for	lenders	to	delay	the	implementation	of	CECL	until	31	December	2020	or	the	end	of
the	coronavirus	national	emergency,	whichever	comes	first.	Given	that	CECL	is	barely	in	its	first	year,	it	was	easier
to	roll	it	back,	whereas	IFRS	9	came	into	force	in	2018	and	is	more	established.	As	a	result,	banks	outside	the	US
have	no	choice	but	to	comply	with	IFRS	9.
In	a	recent	working	paper	with	Haresh	Sapra	at	the	University	of	Chicago	and	Gaoqing	Zhang	at	the	University	of
Minnesota,	we	shed	some	light	on	this	debate	and	assess	the	desirability	of	the	new	expected	loss	provisioning
models.	To	that	end,	we	develop	an	economic	model	to	examine	the	impact	of	moving	from	an	incurred	loss
provisioning	model	to	an	expected	loss	provisioning	model	on	the	banks’	behaviours	and	on	their	capacity	to	lend	to
the	economy.	Our	results	provide	two	interesting	insights	that	may	be	useful	to	both	accounting	standard-setters
and	banking	regulators.
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First,	our	research	highlights	the	crucial	role	of	expected	loss	models	for	prudential	regulators	and	banks’
stakeholders.	In	particular,	we	show	that	timely	loss	recognition	under	an	expected	loss	model	is	beneficial	because
it	allows	regulators	to	intervene	early	and	prevent	banks	from	engaging	in	excessive	risk-taking.	More	importantly,
we	show	that	this	benefit	always	dominates	the	potential	false-alarm	costs	caused	by	the	imprecise	information
inherent	in	the	expected	loss	model.	The	reason	is	that	a	rational	regulator	fully	internalises	the	imprecision	of	the
expected	loss	models	and	always	takes	the	action	that	results	in	the	highest	surplus.
Second,	bankers	fear	that	the	application	of	the	new	expected	loss	models	during	the	Covid-19	pandemic	may	lead
to	a	sudden	significant	increase	in	credit	loss	provisions,	which	would	result	in	an	erosion	of	banks’	capital.
Nevertheless,	such	concerns	are	only	valid	if	prudential	regulators	set	banks’	capital	requirements	independently	of
the	accounting	standards	used	to	provision	for	loan	losses.	Our	paper	shows	that	capital	ratios	and	loan	loss
models	should	be	jointly	determined:	if	banks	change	the	estimation	of	credit	losses,	then	banking	regulators
should	also	adjust	banks’	capital	requirements.	In	another	working	paper	with	Jeremy	Bertomeu	at	University	of
California	San	Diego	and	Haresh	Sapra,	we	show	that	accounting	measurement	and	capital	requirements	are
indeed	complementary	tools	that	affect	the	capacity	of	banks	to	lend	to	the	real	economy.	We	therefore	call	for	a
better	coordination	of	prudential	regulators	and	accounting	standard-setters.
A	key	policy	implication	of	my	research	is	that	changing	the	provisioning	rules	for	estimating	credit	losses	requires
prudential	regulators	to	adjust	capital	adequacy	ratios	at	the	same	time.	In	particular,	my	coauthors	and	I	show	that
relative	to	capital	requirements	under	the	previous	incurred	loss	model,	capital	requirements	under	the	new
expected	loss	model	would	be	looser	when	the	precision	of	estimating	early	credit	losses	is	relatively	high	and/or
when	banks’	risk-taking	incentives	are	not	too	severe.	Looser	capital	requirements	will	in	turn	spur	lending	by
banks.	Hence,	the	new	accounting	rules	may	actually	benefit	lenders	as	well	as	the	whole	economy.	Consistent
with	our	predictions,	most	of	the	publicly	traded	US	banks	did	not	use	the	option	to	delay	the	implementation	of
CECL	in	the	first	quarter	of	2020.
Policymakers	in	the	US	and	in	Europe	have	acknowledged	the	importance	of	the	connection	between	accounting
rules	and	capital	requirements.	It	is	noteworthy	that	the	insight	from	my	research	on	the	complementarity	between
accounting	rules	and	capital	ratios	is	consistent	with	the	recent	actions	taken	by	prudential	regulators.	Indeed,	in	the
US,	the	banks	who	decide	to	comply	with	CECL	benefit	from	temporary	capital	relief	by	the	US	banking	regulators.
Similarly,	in	Europe,	banks	do	not	have	the	option	to	delay	the	implementation	of	IFRS	9	but	are	likely	to	face	looser
capital	requirements	in	the	next	few	years.
In	a	nutshell,	while	my	research	shows	that	policymakers	and	accounting	standard-setters	should	refrain	from
changing	the	expected	loss	standards,	it	provides	a	rationale	for	the	banking	regulators’	decisions	to	loosen	banks’
capital	ratios.	Banks	are	key	players	in	the	economy	as	they	are	in	charge	of	providing	credit	to	firms	and
households.	The	drastic	increase	in	loss	provisions	by	banks	is	a	sign	of	the	economic	pain	to	come.	However,	a
better	coordination	between	prudential	regulators	and	accounting	standard-setters	will	help	banks	to	withstand	this
coronavirus	crisis,	which	will	in	turn	benefit	the	world	economy.
♣♣♣
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